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MyWallSt Unique: The Cautionary Story Of MoviePass

February 18, 2022

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Let’s play a recreation of ‘Solely Join’. What do the controversial navigation app RedZone, a nationwide community of psychics, and Chaka Khan all have in frequent? They’re all linked to financier Ted Farnsworth.

Farnsworth is America’s most unfazed businessman. He begins firms like he’s accumulating Starbucks rewards or airline miles. In keeping with the Miami Herald, he has registered 50 companies within the state of Florida within the final 30 years. Much more awe-inspiring, solely 4 of those had been nonetheless in operation by 2018 and the three that he took public noticed their worth drop by 99% inside three years of itemizing. 

To not point out Farnsworth has been the goal of eight totally different civil fits revolving round unpaid payments and has been cited 11 occasions for failing to pay federal revenue taxes on time.

Farnsworth’s ventures have included a pay-per-call psychic service touted by La Toya Jackson, two vitality drink firms, a vitamin producer, and a few run-of-the-mill multi-level advertising and marketing schemes. 

All of those titans folded in spectacular trend.

First was the Psychic Discovery Community, the epitome of ‘90s hotlines and their infomercials. Its 900 quantity racked up telephone payments throughout the nation earlier than the Federal Commerce Fee stepped in. The Community had greater than 50 client complaints on file, main the FTC to label its gross sales techniques as “abusive” in 1998. Farnsworth acknowledged he knew nothing of those complaints however he did promote his stake within the enterprise.

Subsequent up was the XStream Beverage Community, which stumbled onto the market in 2001 and drummed up investor pleasure in 2002 when it tried to amass European vitality drink, Darkish Canine. Founder and CEO Farnsworth dubiously labeled Darkish Canine because the Pepsi to Crimson Bull’s Coke, considerably embellishing its efficiency and recognition within the area. Sadly, the deal by no means materialized and Farnsworth resigned in 2007 as the corporate was relegated to the world of penny shares. 

Not a month later and he was again on the scene with the Purple Beverage Co. The “antioxidant-rich drink” went public through a reverse merger with a movie firm. For a couple of months it dazzled traders with its spectacular array of celeb spokespeople earlier than collapsing within the wake of the Nice Recession. This was adopted by LTS Nutraceuticals, which vanished virtually as quick because it had appeared because of a failure to “make required regulatory filings”.

Whereas he was down, Farnsworth was not out. In 2015, he based Zone Applied sciences, the creator of RedZone Maps, a navigation app that diverts you round “hazard and crime” utilizing crowdsourced data. 

Critics had been fast to level out this type of knowledge assortment promotes racial profiling, however that didn’t cease Farnsworth. He hyped the corporate a lot it attracted the eye of Helios and Matheson Analytics, an equally murky and troublesome IT and knowledge administration firm primarily based in New York. Helios and Matheson purchased RedZone in 2016, making Farnsworth Chairman. He would turn into CEO three months later.

This might set Ted Farnsworth on a collision course with 2017’s most notorious firm: MoviePass.


    Mission: Unimaginable

    MoviePass was based in 2011 by Stacy Spikes and Hamet Watt. Spikes was a music and movie govt who had the thought for a film theatre subscription way back to 2005 however couldn’t discover any traders or companions. 

    On the time, film theaters and manufacturing firms had been centered on upselling, therefore the dramatic rise in 3D cinema and big-budget photos. Theatres believed that in the event that they elevated spectacle, they might justifiably elevate ticket costs and make up for any lower in theatergoers. When James Cameron’s ‘Titanic’ got here out in 1997, it was the highest-grossing and costliest film ever made.

    However issues modified significantly between 2005 and 2011.

    The film theatre enterprise appears to be one of many nice quandaries of the fashionable age. It in some way manages to be in a perpetual state of decline and but thrives during times of financial uncertainty. Throughout the Nice Melancholy — regardless of mass layoffs, widespread bankruptcies, and hundreds of thousands of foreclosures — Hollywood entered its Golden Age. All through the interval, between 60 and 80 million Individuals went to the flicks as soon as every week or extra. Not lengthy after, the tv arrived. In 1946, British cinema attendance was a staggering 1.6 billion. By 1965, this quantity had fallen by greater than 75%.

    The cinema enterprise ebbs and flows. When the 1981-82 recession hit, the worst because the Nice Melancholy, American theatre attendance jumped by greater than 10%, whereas the unemployment price rose sharply. In 2009, throughout the top of the Nice Recession, ticket gross sales had been up greater than 17% whereas attendance rose by 16% year-over-year.

    Nonetheless, by 2011, issues had been coming to a head. The enhance of Recession escapism and the novelty of 3D had been shortly waning. 2011 marked the worst yr for motion pictures in additional than 15 years. Ticket revenues dropped by 4.5% year-over-year whereas theatre attendance continued its regular decline. That very same yr, Netflix turned the most important supply of Web streaming visitors in North America and it launched its first unique collection: ‘Home of Playing cards’.

    Perhaps it was time to revisit the subscription service thought.

    No Nation for Previous Males

    By 2011, Spikes and Watt got here collectively to boost $1 million in enterprise capital and launch a subscription trial in San Francisco. Preliminary demand shocked them. Regardless of solely being supplied in 21 theatres, 19,000 customers tried to enroll on the primary day, crashing the corporate’s server. However, there have been nonetheless a number of kinks to work out.

    First off, MoviePass didn’t inform any of the included cinemas that the service was launching, leaving many questioning why they had been all of the sudden being inundated with digital bookings. Most of them stopped accepting MoviePass tickets inside three days. 

    On high of this, MoviePass hadn’t fairly labored out how greatest to collaborate with theatre chains so it was merely reserving tickets on behalf of its members through Sadly, is owned by AMC and the theatre large wasn’t joyful its personal web site was being commandeered by a third-party service. It threatened authorized motion in opposition to MoviePass, so it was again to the drafting board.

    A second check launched a couple of months later in collaboration with Hollywood Film Cash, a nationwide reward card firm. With Cash’s 36,000 theaters, MoviePass launched in new markets, creating membership charges primarily based upon common native ticket costs. Subscriptions price between $29 and $34 a month, had a restricted variety of motion pictures, and required customers to print a voucher to redeem at their theatre. This was shortly deemed too cumbersome and annoying and was changed by an app and digital vouchers. However, as soon as once more, AMC stepped in and pressured Hollywood Film Cash to interrupt off its partnership with MoviePass or danger dropping entry to 1000’s of theaters.

    Undeterred, Spikes and Watt raised extra capital and gained key traders AOL and William Morris Endeavor. Collectively, they approached Uncover Card and struck a deal to launch the MoviePass debit card. This allowed for a seamless ticketing course of as MoviePass would load the price of tickets onto the cardboard and members would use it to pay on the field workplace. It additionally backed film theatre chains right into a nook as they had been pressured to simply accept the playing cards anyplace they accepted a daily Uncover card. Worse nonetheless for AMC, MoviePass’ recognition finally attracted the eye of MasterCard.

    By 2014, the MoviePass MasterCard had made its debut, that means greater than 91% of all cinemas in the USA might be accessed by a subscriber. This, mixed with the continued decline in theater attendance, broke AMC and the chain agreed to enter into a short lived partnership with MoviePass.

    Misplaced in Translation

    In January of 2015, the one-year AMC-MoviePass pilot program was launched in Boston and Denver. On the time, MoviePass had a couple of thousand subscribers paying round $32 a month. This price was raised to between $35 and $45 upon request from AMC, with extra fees for premium codecs like IMAX and 3D. In trade, subscribers might see one film a day. MoviePass agreed to pay face worth for tickets and AMC would pay to entry detailed client knowledge.

    This partnership was an enormous deal for MoviePass as a result of it was the primary time it had an opportunity to legitimize its enterprise mannequin within the eyes of the broader business. Spikes and Watt believed that this system was their alternative to show {that a} subscription service would enhance cinema foot visitors and concession gross sales. The hope was this might finally incentivize film theatres to promote tickets to MoviePass at a reduction, which might end result within the service turning into worthwhile.

    Over the course of the yr, MoviePass and AMC ready knowledge for a white paper report. The outcomes had been printed in early 2016 and issues appeared fairly blended.

    Preliminary figures confirmed the common AMC moviegoer heads to the cinema one and half occasions a month. After MoviePass, it elevated to simply over thrice monthly. Nonetheless, this influence was not long-lasting. The speed regressed again in the direction of the pre-MoviePass common because the service’s novelty wore off. If customers didn’t go to the flicks at the least two occasions a month, they had been paying extra for a MoviePass subscription than the corporate would spend on tickets, that means it might flip a wholesome revenue from shoppers’ forgetfulness.

    In keeping with Enterprise Insider, officers inside AMC had been unimpressed and satisfied they might create a greater and extra profitable subscription service in-house. Some even believed that MoviePass had deliberately skewed knowledge to its profit.

    For that reason, AMC terminated its settlement with MoviePass and as soon as once more the 2 had been at odds.

    If We Construct It, They Will Come

    Regardless of disappointing the most important film theatre chain on the earth, MoviePass wouldn’t quit. In June 2016, Mitch Lowe, a former govt of Netflix and RedBox turned MoviePass’ CEO. Stacy Spikes turned co-chairman with Hamet Watt.

    Lowe was fast to flaunt the service’s supposed strengths: it was common with Millennials, its subscribers spent 120% extra on concessions, and it elevated a movie’s theatrical launch window by incentivizing patrons to move to the flicks after opening weekend. In keeping with Lowe, if MoviePass might purchase “3 million subscribers, it might probably add 5 p.c to whole ticket gross sales”. This could have been nice information for theatre house owners and manufacturing firms, to not point out that MoviePass hoped to sooner or later promote studios detailed client knowledge to assist them higher choose and launch movies.

    However these silver linings weren’t sufficient to make up for the truth that MoviePass was missing its key ingredient: subscribers — tons and many subscribers.

    After its AMC pilot, MoviePass’ limitless plan remained at an eye-watering $50 a month. In keeping with the corporate, this was to make sure MoviePass might “bear the danger of over-usage, and get the good thing about under-usage”. Clearly, this was not a deal shoppers had been keen to take, as MoviePass had a mere 20,000 subscribers and $10 million in income.

    Then, Lowe struck up a friendship with Brian Schultz, the CEO of Studio Film Grill, a small chain of Texas-based cinemas recognized for its in-theater eating expertise. In December of 2016, Studio Film Grill bought a stake in MoviePass. The identical week, Shultz introduced Studio Film Grill would provide its clients a one-month, limitless MoviePass trial for $10. This occasion would turn into a good looking case of foreshadowing.

    Whereas Lowe admitted the momentary measure would “be costly”, he believed it was a crucial “a part of their subscriber acquisition prices”. Studio Film Grill was longing for the deal within the hopes it might enhance their already spectacular concession income as a result of truth they served full meals and alcoholic drinks. However with a mere 24 places, it was unclear how a lot of an influence the deal would have for MoviePass.

    The Huge Lebowski 

    A yr later, MoviePass was struggling. Subscriber numbers remained low, prices excessive, and there was no signal of any main theater chain coming again to the negotiating desk.

    With their dream on the road, Spikes and Lowe took investor conferences in New York, and there they met Ted Farnsworth. 

    Upon first impression, one former MoviePass worker known as him a “bumbling, lovable, type of optimistic man” who “desires to be your greatest buddy”. 

    One other known as him a “con artist”… 

    By that summer season of 2017, Ted Farnsworth was on the helm of Helios and Matheson Analytics (HMNY), a supplier of “insights into social phenomena” (no matter meaning). 

    Clearly, Farnsworth wasn’t fairly positive both. In keeping with Bloomberg, when requested what his firm did he responded: “They do…. ummm… oh gosh, I don’t even know the best way to clarify it to you. Huge knowledge. Crunching knowledge.”


    Regardless, Farnsworth’s pitch to MoviePass was undeniably engaging: $25 million for 51% of the corporate, two seats on the five-member board, and a promise to drop the month-to-month limitless subscription worth, briefly, to $9.95. It’s unclear how Farnsworth received to this determine — clearly, math wasn’t concerned contemplating the common price of a film ticket was greater than $9. In keeping with Enterprise Insider: “he needed a worth that might seize headlines”.

    Regardless of the joy of MoviePass’ board, Spikes was doubtful of the deal. In keeping with him, as much as that time, MoviePass had been “methodical about testing worth factors” and had gotten the subscription to as little as $12.99 in some areas. Nonetheless, any decrease than that and the service couldn’t flip a revenue because the low worth would incentive overuse. Nonetheless, Spikes’ considerations had been drowned out by Farnsworth and his promise to take the corporate public if it reached 100,000 subscribers. MoviePass’ board authorised the deal in July 2017.

    Inside two days of the value discount, MoviePass reached 100,000 subscribers. Inside 30 days, it had 400,000. When these outcomes had been introduced to the general public it launched Helios’ inventory into the stratosphere. Over the course of a month, its share worth rose from $2.50 to $20.40, a wholesome eight-bagger for traders loopy sufficient to take a chunk. 

    However, all of the whereas, the corporate was utterly unprepared to deal with the stress of its ballooning person base. Its customer support strains had been flooded and its vendor ran out of plastic with which to print new MoviePass playing cards.

    The sudden rush of shoppers fearful Spikes and he pleaded with different executives to boost costs. However, Farnsworth and Lowe didn’t wish to lose momentum. By December, Spikes and Watt had been voted off the board. Just a few weeks later, Spikes was fired through e-mail. The identical day, MoviePass hit a million subscribers — a milestone it hit quicker than Netflix and Hulu.


    The months that adopted can solely be described as reckless.

    Subscriber numbers continued to climb. By April 2018, there have been 2 million customers and MoviePass was sponsoring occasions at Coachella. That very same month, Helios and Matheson filed its annual report back to the SEC detailing a lack of $150.8 million. Helios’ unbiased auditor started expressing doubts the corporate might keep in enterprise. It was time to start out slicing corners.

    MoviePass’ biggest adversary was its heavy customers, savvy clients who had been bleeding the limitless plan for all it was price. These titans of cinema had been heading to the theatre day by day, even when they didn’t watch a single movie. Some subscribers primarily based in New York Metropolis reported they used their MoviePass as a approach to entry clear, public bogs in Midtown Manhattan. They’d choose up a ticket for a random film, check-in on the field workplace, and sneak out 5-10 minutes later. Lowe wanted to discover a approach to gradual these customers down and he opted for trickery and lies.

    Lowe and Farnsworth known as a gathering of MoviePass’ board wherein they proposed to secretly change the passwords of customers to dam them from accessing highly-anticipated movies. Executives had been confused. One warned that it might “catch the FTC’s consideration and will reinvigorate their questioning of MoviePass, this time from a Shopper Safety standpoint.” The CEO shrugged this fear off and resigned to launch this system with a “small group”. He recommended they begin with “2% of [their] highest quantity customers”, representing 75,000 folks.

    Lowe was additionally desperate to introduce some friction to MoviePass’ client journey. In the summertime of 2018, the corporate started requiring 20% of its customers to add images of their ticket stubs for approval. If their stubs weren’t authorised, their account could be canceled. Lowe labored onerous to make sure the “randomly chosen” customers had been all high-power subscribers. The catch was the method didn’t work on many smartphone working techniques and the service’s personal verification software program typically failed. With an virtually non-existent customer support community, MoviePass had discovered a approach to churn its costliest customers.

    Each of those applications had been in place for the launch of ‘Avengers: Infinity Warfare’. A few complaints popped up on-line however most disregarded the incident as a technological glitch.

    Its impacts had been unremarkable. By July, MoviePass was dropping $40 million a month and Helios’ inventory had fallen 99%.

    Mission: Unimaginable – Fallout

    All of the whereas, Farnsworth and Lowe had been pretending all the things was high quality.

    Farnsworth gave an interview to Vice in June of 2018 wherein he acknowledged “completely extra money goes out than coming in. Which isn’t any totally different from Spotify going by way of $4 billion [it actually lost $1.5 billion that year] or Uber, or anybody else that’s a pioneer within the house”. He didn’t appear fearful, as a substitute, he was assured that MoviePass’ knowledge assortment would repay, proposing that the service might turn into very important for studio promoting.

    In a weird, streaming service-like twist, he additionally revealed that executives at MoviePass deliberate “from day one to purchase and produce [their] personal motion pictures” as a result of they “can assure a field workplace” and curb bills by limiting releases to subscribers. This led Farnsworth to vow a various array of extra providers and income alternatives, from promoting movie rights to HBO and Netflix to giving subscribers free popcorn after they noticed a MoviePass manufacturing.

    Internally although, mayhem nonetheless raged.

    Starting in July, MoviePass applied surge pricing, charging an additional $2 to see the most recent blockbuster franchise. Lowe chalked the price enhance as much as a need to “unfold out enterprise for the corporate’s theater companions into the weeks following the sometimes excessive visitors opening weekends”. Nonetheless, this response was met with skepticism from customers they usually complained ferociously. In actuality, MoviePass was operating out of cash to pay for tickets.

    By this time, MoviePass was dropping $40 million a month and it was getting onerous to cover from traders. The inventory had tumbled greater than 98% because it’s all-time excessive in October 2017.

    On July twenty sixth, there was an outage. MoviePass members confirmed up on the theatre for late evening screenings and their playing cards had been rejected. The corporate was fast in charge this upon technical points.

    We’ve decided this difficulty shouldn’t be with our card processor companions and shall be persevering with to work on a repair all through this night and evening. If in case you have not headed to the theater but, we advocate ready for a decision or using e-ticketing which isn’t impacted.

    — MoviePass (@MoviePass) July 27, 2018

    In actuality, MoviePass’ funds had run dry. In keeping with the corporate: “The service provider processor that funds the MoviePass membership card stopped advancing funds for the acquisition of film tickets for our subscribers. Consequently the variety of tickets we might buy was significantly lowered.” This simply occurred to coincide with the discharge of ‘Mission: Unimaginable — Fallout’, one of many largest movies of the yr. In an effort to hold the service considerably afloat, MoviePass blocked greater than 600,000 members from reserving tickets to ‘Mission: Unimaginable’ throughout its launch weekend.

    A mere 5 days earlier than, Helios and Matheson had introduced a 250-for-1 reverse inventory break up. This might enhance its inventory worth from 8 cents to $21. Most considered this as an try to stop the corporate from being kicked off the Nasdaq. The day of the outage, HMNY misplaced greater than 50% of its already deflated worth.


    On Monday, the corporate obtained an emergency mortgage. In keeping with filings from the SEC, Helios and Matheson obtained $5 million in money from Hudson Bay, which might demand reimbursement of greater than $3 million lower than a month later.

    Issues would by no means be the identical once more.

    With the general public’s religion within the firm firmly shaken, MoviePass virtually deserted its foundational objective. Lowe demanded that each one huge blockbusters be blocked on the MoviePass app. Engineers had been instructed to create a tripwire that might shut down the service if MoviePass exceeded a specific amount of each day bookings. When the cash ran out, subscribers could be informed there have been no extra screenings of their space.

    In keeping with a former staffer interviewed by Enterprise Insider: “the journey wire began at a couple of million {dollars}, however finally wound down to a couple hundred thousand”. The entire course of was a “guessing recreation”.

    On the similar time, MoviePass had added a complicated rabbit gap to its app to trick customers who had cancelled their membership into re-subscribing.

    All of the whereas, Helios inventory was pushed deeper into the mud. Even with its dramatic reverse inventory break up, it was now buying and selling for lower than $1.

    As 2018 rolled on, workers had been laid off or stop the corporate in droves.

    Regardless of all this, Farnsworth and Lowe continued to journey by personal jet, attend high-end capabilities, and throw yacht events in Miami on the corporate’s dime. The pair had been additionally accused of defending their buddy and MoviePass advertising and marketing marketing consultant Bob Ellis from disciplinary motion when he was repeatedly reported for sexually harassing his feminine co-workers.

    Not with a Bang however a Whimper

    In February of 2019, Helios and Matheson inventory was delisted from the Nasdaq. By April, it was revealed MoviePass had a mere 225,000 subscribers, a big drop from its 3 million subscriber peak. In an actual “kick them when they’re down” second, AMC introduced its competing service, Stubs A-Checklist which price $19.95 a month, achieved 800,000 subscribers in Could.

    In August, Mossab Hussein, a safety researcher at Dubai-based cybersecurity agency SpiderSilk, discovered certainly one of MoviePass’ databases was not protected by a password. It contained 161 million data, together with the private data and bank card numbers of greater than 50,000 subscribers. On the similar time, MoviePass followers and retail traders had been discussing the corporate’s gimmicks on Reddit, leading to two class-action lawsuits. These rumblings triggered a hefty investigation from FTC that was solely settled in June of 2021.

    On the 14th of September 2019, MoviePass purchased its final ticket. The dream and the nightmare had come to an in depth.

    To not be outdone, Ted Farnsworth introduced he was assembling a workforce of traders to purchase Helios and Matheson and MoviePass away from its Indian dad or mum firm however these plans by no means materialized.

    Rear Window

    As an investor, it may be troublesome to see critical classes among the many smoking rubble and hilarity of MoviePass however they’re undoubtedly there.

    Firstly, it’s an excellent reminder that if one thing appears to be good to be true, it in all probability is. There was no method MoviePass’ mannequin was sustainable, even with its lofty ambitions for large knowledge, promoting, and self-made content material. Corporations can hype their future as a lot as they need however they should survive till tomorrow to get there. On this case, it’s clear the general public and the media’s pleasure could have blinded some traders.

    We are able to additionally see the trials and tribulations of the ramping up interval and the difficulties firm’s encounter after they all of the sudden go viral. Mitch Lowe mirrored on this in August of 2018 when he mentioned he regretted dropping the value to $9.99 because it precipitated too many individuals to enroll. MoviePass didn’t have the infrastructure to help such an inflow of shoppers.

    Most significantly, MoviePass is a cautionary story of disruption. There are many antiquated industries in our midst, experiences that might be improved through know-how or innovation. However options from one business can’t be so unexpectedly utilized to a different. When Mitch Lowe turned CEO, he was heralded because the pure chief for MoviePass because of his expertise in Netflix and Redbox, however the at-home film market and the in-theatre market current very totally different challenges.

    For one factor, it’s important to cope with the segmentation of the theatre business, dominant chains like AMC, and regional worth variations. This made a one-size-fits-all, direct-to-consumer subscription mannequin illogical. 

    There could be no approach to successfully disrupt the business with out important theatre partnerships or an incredible variety of subscribers (and I imply far more than 3 million). MoviePass had neither and as soon as it proved itself disappointing to AMC, it created a robust enemy. The film theatre enterprise did have to be disrupted, its attendance suffered a 25-year low in 2016 however the answer was unlikely to come back from exterior a longtime participant. Therefore, why AMC’s A-Checklist was doing so properly previous to Covid.

    Lastly, administration groups are actually necessary. On the onset, MoviePass gave the impression to be in good fingers with Lowe on the wheel however as soon as Farnsworth received concerned it ought to have set off some alarms. In fact, it did in some spheres. Bloomberg and the Miami Herald wrote about Farnsworth’s questionable previous in 2017 however it seems to have flown beneath the nostril of many.

    Finish Credit

    I would love you to think about these subsequent few paragraphs because the “The place are they now?” epilogue that seems in all inspirational, based-on-a-true-story motion pictures. Every description needs to be imposed over a picture of every character in movement and set to ‘That’s Life’ by Frank Sinatra.

    Mitch Lowe

    Mitch Lowe remained at film go till Helios and Matheson filed for Chapter 7 chapter in January 2020.

    In June 2021, he and Farnsworth agreed to pay a $400,000 settlement in California for “illegal enterprise practices”. The FTC concluded that: “MoviePass and its executives went to nice lengths to disclaim shoppers entry to the service they paid for whereas additionally failing to safe their private data.”

    He’s now a marketing consultant.

    Ted Farnsworth

    Farnsworth has all the time been a “fall down 7 occasions, stand up 8”-type of man. In 2021, he based ZASH International Media and Leisure “an advanced community of synergetic firms working collectively to disrupt the media and leisure business”. 

    Once more, insightful.

    ZASH is almost all stakeholder in Lomotif, an American-made competitor (full copy-paste ripoff) of TikTok. It additionally owns a bitcoin mining firm. Lately, ZASH merged with publicly traded Vinco Ventures (BBIG).

    (Please, nobody purchase this inventory)

    Stacy Spikes

    In March of 2019, Spikes began PreShow, an app that provides you free film tickets for watching 15 to twenty minutes of adverts. It might seem that concept hasn’t seen a lot success as the corporate’s web site now says it helps customers trade their “time and a spotlight for in-game forex for greater than 20,000 of at the moment’s hottest video games”.

    Extra importantly, in December of 2021, Spikes was granted possession of MoviePass and its property by a New York Metropolis court docket. It’s believed his bid was for lower than $250,000. 

    In keeping with Spikes: “We’re thrilled to have it again, and are exploring the opportunity of relaunching quickly.”

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